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78-24-3(2) (c) 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
from a Circuit Court conviction under Section 78-24-3 (2) (c) of 
the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case concerns an appeal by the Defendant of his 
conviction in the Fourth (now Second) Circuit Court of the charge 
of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of a 
Bountiful City Ordinance. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the Circuit Court commit reversible error in instructing 
the jury that "actual physical control of" was an alternate 
element to "drove" in the crime of Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol , without a further instruction on the definition of 
"actual physical control"? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 10, 1987, while on routine patrol, Sergeant 
James Garner of the Bountiful Police Department discovered a 
stationary car facing eastbound in the westbound lane of 500 
South in Bountiful, Utah (A.S.,1). Sgt. Garner approached the 
vehicle, found the Defendant in the driver's seat behind the 
steering wheel (A.S.,2), and detected the strong odor of alcohol 
coming from the Defendant's breath and from the vehicle (A.S.,5). 
Although the Defendant only admitted to drinking two beers prior 
to his stopping at that location (A.S.,11), Sgt. Garner observed 
several beer cans on the floor of the vehicle (A.S.,4). The 
Defendant further claimed to have consumed beer after he stopped 
with his vehicle facing oncoming traffic (A.S.,9). After the 
Defendant attempted to perform field sobriety tests, he was 
arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
At trial, the Court gave the following instruction: 
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No. 7 
Before you can convict the Defendant of the crime of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, you must find from 
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of the crime: 
1. That on or about November 10th, 1987, the 
Defendant drove or was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle• 
2. That such driving was in Bountiful, Utah. 
3. That at said time and place, the Defendant was 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
If you are satisfied from the evidence that the City 
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of 
the above-enumerated elements, you must find the defendant 
guilty as charged. On the other hand if the City has failed 
to satisfy your minds on one or more of the above-enumerated 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
The Court did not give any further instruction as a 
definition of "actual physical control." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The words "actual physical control" are words of common 
usage without statutory definition. They need not be defined by 
specific instruction to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED BY THE COURT. 
In its instructions to the jury, the Court stated in full 
every element of the offense of Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol. No element was left out. For that reason, Appellant's 
case of State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980) is not in point 
because intent to deprive is an express element of theft by 
deception (76-6-405 U.C.A.). Since Laine was reversed due to the 
omission of a basic element of the offense from the instruction, 
it has no applicability here. 
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Appellant's case of State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 219 (Utah 
1986), is equally inapplicable. There, the Court failed to 
define the term "attempted" in a robbery instruction. However, 
"attempt" is a word of art which has a specific statutory 
meaning, which is set forth in 76-4-101 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended. 
Nowhere has the Utah Legislature ever defined the term 
"actual physical control." Had it desired to do so, it could 
easily have done so. It has not done so because the words have 
an ordinary meaning which need not be defined, as "driving" or 
"operating" are not defined. In State v. Bugger, 25 U.2d 404 
(1971), at page 405, the Utah Supreme Court referred to "actual 
physical control" "in its ordinary sense." 
The instruction given by the Court gave every element of the 
offense. No further definition of those elements was necessary 
or required. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's instruction to the jury upon the elements of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol was not reversible error. 
The instruction should be upheld and the conyiction affirmed. 
Dated this 27th day of May, 1988. 
RUSSELL L. MAHAN 
Attorney for the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent 
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